Thursday, September 27, 2007


The old stalwarts are disappointing me.

First, Engdahl unnecessarily explains his abandonment of the silly ‘Peak Oil’ theory by taking up the still very controversial – some would say ‘flaky’ – Russian theories concerning the creation of oil.  The Russians may well be right, but Peak Oil falls on its own.  There’s tons of oil around.  In the United States itself, there is enough oil in the oil shales to satisfy current levels of American requirements for over 100 years.  The problem is cost of production.  Let me state it clearly:  the reason why the American Establishment agreed to the attack on Iraq, an attack they knew was going to be a disaster and would indeed lead to insecurity over Middle East oil supplies, was to force the price per barrel of oil up over the amount where exploitation of the Canadian oil sands would become economically viable.  There.  I’ve said it.  The long-term plan is to base American oil security on the sane and dependable Canadians, and not leave it to the whims of the fruitcakes in the Middle East, the fruitcakiest being the Israelis and their American ‘friends’.  The Americans don’t get much oil from the Middle East, but it is important oil, and the price of oil remains dependent on decisions made by people who aren’t Americans, and don’t have America’s interests at heart.  The war had nothing to do with controlling Middle East oil supplies, something which should, at least by now, be obvious.  In the long term, the war was about separating the United States from Israel (the American strategists must find it funny that the neocons fell for it, as the Iraq war created the perfect petri dish to grow the new idea that American national interests are different from those of Zionist colonialists).  When the oil sands peter out, we’ll need another war to force the price over the amount required for the Americans to exploit the oil shales (experimentation on oil shales development has already started).

I should note that the general lumpen-leftist view that the war was about forcing the price of oil up doesn’t make sense.  The American establishment are both producers and consumers of oil.  There is a ‘sweet spot’, where they maximize their profit, but a war is too blunt an instrument to get there, if you could even determine what the sweet spot is.  The other point, which I keep making (to no avail), is that the American oligarchs have absolutely no interest in depriving their new manufacturers (the Chinese) from a source of energy.  Globalization happened and the strategists are still writing like it’s 1970.

Peter Dale Scott continues with his theory that Cheney’s prevarications about what he was up to on the morning of September 11 relate to the fact he was hiding something, including his involvement in the shooting down of Flight 93.  I doubt it.  This represents a misunderstanding of the nature of the conspiracy.  It was planned in such a way as to minimize – or, preferably, eliminate – connections between the operators of the conspiracy and identifiable politicians.  Everybody was terrified about how Iran-Contra played out, and didn’t want to see that happen again.  Important people, some of them in the Bush Administration, almost went to jail.  One plane falling out of the control of the commandoes was perfectly foreseeable, and there would have been a contingency plan for it, one not involving Cheney having to ad lib a response.  The reason Cheney is being deliberately confusing about the morning of September 11 has another conspiracy explanation.  Continuity of government.  Scott focuses on it, but then tries to tie Cheney’s actions to the shooting down of the plane, a completely unnecessary connection, and one not supported by what we know.  Referring to Flight 93 actually damages Scott’s paper.

Cheney and his ilk are terrified that the next attack will involve the destruction of the United States’ ability to plan a response, so have created elaborate – and no doubt unconstitutional – plans for continuity of government, some kind of dictatorship led by people like Cheney.  Those plans collapse if the enemy can determine what people like Cheney will be doing after an attack.  Thus the intentional creation of confusion.  There is no need to drag Flight 93 into the mix, and doing so detracts from consideration of the wisdom of allowing freaks like Cheney to take over the American government in cases where they can claim, without anything other than their own say-so, that they have to.  The evidence actually supports Scott’s thesis about the key role of continuity of government better if we leave out the shooting down of Flight 93.  That would leave room for reasonable discussion of the necessity of some sort of doomsday plan for when all the usual ‘deciders’ – Bush’s name for it – were dead.